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Abstract 
The nearly exclusive explanation for current account imbalances in the euro area blames real 
economy differences between countries, prominently the competitiveness of the participating 
states. This essay questions the common opinion that wage policy is crucial for rebalancing 
the European economies. This essay attempts to unfurl the real economy processes from the 
perspective of money and finance. This essay identifies an interregional asset-price-interest 
mechanism at work in the monetary union: A general change in the state of confidence 
provokes asset prices and the effective long-run interest rate to change and to affect 
aggregate demand and trade flows. A change in competitive positions of countries follows as 
the second-round effect. The policy implications prefer a downscaling of the financial sector 
against government interventions into wage formation.  
JELclassifications: E12, E43, F15, F36, G15 
Key words: Financial flows, liquidity-preference, trade imbalances, competitiveness, euro 
area  
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper questions the dominant explanation of trade imbalances in the euro area (EA) since 
its official start in 1999 and the resulting split in debtor and creditor countries by changes in 
their competitiveness position. My essay seeks to show why and how excessive cross-border 
finance is the main cause of the deteriorated competitiveness position of certain EA member 
states and not vice versa. The idea of a reversed causality resembles Böhm-Bawerk’s famous 
dictum (1914: 508): “Die Zahlungsbilanz befiehlt, die Handelsbilanz gehorcht, nicht 
umgekehrt”.2 This statement contains two assumptions, which are characteristic for the 
modern balance-of-payments analysis, which I will not adopt. The first assumption is the 
basis of the canonical consideration of net flows in many real economy models. A net 
resource transfer in the trade or current account balance is assumed to be identical with its 
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external financing. In the succession of Böhm-Bawerk, this approach assumes the equivalence 
of savings (current account) and investment financing (capital account). This approach 
produced such confusion as the Lucas-Paradox, the Feldstein-Horioka-Puzzle or 
contemporary statements that a surplus in the current account finances the investment of a 
second country or the rest of the world. This approach is rooted in the mix-up of physical with 
financial resources, hence money or claims on money (credit). Borio and Disyatat (2015) 
show in extenso, and Hobza and Zeugner (2014) provide the data for the EA, that in a 
multilateral world, bilateral current account deficits usually do not correspond with gross or 
net financial flows. Both saving and financing are different issues. A balance-of-payments 
analysis with net flows is not able to reveal the adjustment mechanisms either in the real or in 
the financial sector of an economy. Therefore, my analysis is based on gross capital flows.  
The second assumption not adopted here is the underlying theory of the rate of interest, which 
guides the explanation of causes and effects of capital flows in the EA by certain 
contemporary followers of Böhm-Bawerk (for example, Sinn 2010). The interest rate ensures 
the intertemporal commodity equilibrium between today’s saving (for investment) and future 
consumption. Because of Keynes (1936), we know that the rate of interest is a monetary 
phenomenon. His liquidity-preference theory substantiates a reversed causality that runs from 
the state of confidence through asset prices, the rate of interest and the investment in physical 
capital. My study identifies the interregional asset-price-interest mechanism as being crucial 
for the interaction between independent expansions of finance and trade imbalances in a 
monetary union and discusses it against the background of disparate regions. This, as far I 
know, new approach identifies cross-border gross financial flows as a trigger of trade flows 
between regions or countries. Thus, my approach is also distinct from pure commodity-
market models such as the Dutch-Disease literature, which models the harmful impacts of a 
transfer of income to the receiving country. However, financial flows do not arise from 
savings but from the creation of credit by their financial sector.  
This study attempts to unfurl the real economy processes in the EA from the perspective of 
money and the virtual explosion of financial flows. There is, to the best of my knowledge, no 
similar approach, although the literature on imbalances and competitiveness in the EA is 
impressively vast. The paper attempts to address two questions: (1) Are capital flows 
detached from the real economy in the modern financial capitalism including the EA and 
why? This question is the subject of the next section, which shows why expansions and 
contractions on the modern global financial markets follow changes in the state of confidence 
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and not events in the real economy.  (2) How can we describe the linkage of financial flows 
and the real economy? The answer is  the model in section three that explains why and how 
detached cross-border financial flows for their part effectuate real economy adjustments. 
Section four briefly discusses other interpretations, and section five presents certain recent 
empirical studies. Section six concludes that not only maywage policies be crucial for re-
balancing the monetary union but also a control and reduction of its financial sectors.  
 
2. The  separate life of modern finance  
 
2.1 Liquidity preference and casino capitalism  
The distinct sign of a capitalist economy is the use of money for the transfer of purchasing 
power from the present to the future. This function includes the fundamental uncertainty with 
respect to the expected return of each investment in the future. The preference of agents to 
hold unprofitable money reflects their desire to always remain solvent, and an increase in this 
preference signals a possibly approaching threat of insolvency. The alternative to unprofitable 
money is the investment in interest-bearing securities, which presumes a certain trust of the 
investor in the ability of the debtor to repay. The existence of a financial sector is rooted 
exclusively in this function of money to reduce uncertainty and increase the flexibility for the 
holder. The revolutionary achievement of Keynes for modern economics is not the discovery 
of the principle of effective demand (others have done this earlier) but to have identified the 
preference for liquidity as a key driver for effective demand and its changes. His theory is a 
liquidity theory of effective demand.  
 
The liquidity-preference theory is the lens through which one may detect that financial market 
developments may not necessarily be derived from events in production, distribution and 
allocation or, in sum, the real economy.3  Instead, events and sentiments on financial markets 
are passed onto the real economy through the long-term nominal interest rate. However, 
financial markets do not fix the interest rate but the market value or price of a security. A rise 
in the general preference for liquidity, hence money, induces the market value of all assets to 
contract.4 Rational agents will invest less into physical capacities, buy or issue fewer shares 
and other financial assets or restrict, as a private household, certain segments of its 
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consumption.  The financial sector will be less inclined to acquire debt titles so that their 
market value will contract.   In these circumstances, any investor who considers the purchase 
of a financial asset expects a higher interest rate as a risk premium. The higher the state of 
confidence is, the higher is the market value of a representative asset and the lower is its 
effective return. In case of an infinite life-span of the paper (e.g., shares), we have   
)(AP
zi            (1) 
where z is the primarily fixed nominal interest or coupon rate, PA is the market value of the 
paper determined by the state of confidence μ, and i the effective interest rate or the yield.5  
This inverse relation is crucial for understanding the interaction between demand for 
investment in the real economy and the financial markets. A higher effective interest rate (= 
higher liquidity preference) is tantamount to a lower readiness of the corporate sector to take 
debts to finance net investment and the financial sector to buy debt titles and to re-finance 
through the issuance of the entity’s own debt titles. The demand for investment in the capital 
stock weakens, and the price non-financial corporations would pay for capital goods. The 
process passes with reversed signs, when uncertainty and the liquidity preference decrease. 
Incidentally, with a time lag, z responds to a change in i because events in the secondary 
markets of previously issued papers will be transferred to the primary market of new 
emissions. 
The lens of the liquidity theory opens the view to an extreme version of autonomous capital 
market developments that Keynes named casino after the experience with stock market 
crashes in 1929 (Keynes, 1936, Book 12, VI). He did not investigate this market in greater 
detail as Hyman Minsky (1982) or Susan Strange (1986) later did. In particular, Susan 
Strange marks ‘casino capitalism’ as the decoupling of financial markets from the real 
economy. A related term is financialization. Similar to casino capitalism, financialization 
implies that investment into physical capacities is not the dominant matter of financing but the 
purchase of financial resources. 
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2.2 Institutional attributes and dynamics of globally integrated financial markets   
 
Until the beginning of the 1970s, the financial system consisted of credit banks controlled by 
the central bank, completed by conservatively acting saving banks and pension funds, and the 
access to the foreign financial market was regulated and restricted for both domestic and 
foreign agents. The system followed a period of global liberalization and deregulation, an 
extreme rise in the volatility of financial and global resource markets, and an explosion of 
cross-border capital flows, financial innovations and new institutions. Bresser-Pereira (2010) 
defines ‘financialization’ as the new set of institutional arrangements after the liberalization 
and deregulation of financial markets. The modern financial system is full of shadow and 
quasi-banks, legally independent special vehicles, and private equity funds, which all abscond 
from traditional banking supervision. A new type of financial institution has emerged, the 
Highly Leveraged Institution (HLI), whose business model targets high profits by leveraging a 
low input of equity, however implicitly, by taking simultaneously higher risks. The most well-
known HLIs are Hedge Funds, often with their residence in off-shore centers and tax havens 
and which do not need a license from the national supervisory authority.  
 
For corporations, the modern financial markets create opportunities for book profits when 
their balance-sheet positions are valued at the higher mark-to-market-value compared to the 
book-value. Notional gains in these companies’ balance-sheets protect against hostile 
takeovers that had become more likely in a globalized environment and improve the 
conditions of external refunding. This new company strategy entails an orientation towards 
short-term profits, which are easier to obtain by financial assets than by net investment into 
productive capacities. Thus, investment in (foreign) financial assets and real estate may 
replace capital investment (at home). For example, the global Siemens Corporation reported a 
fixed asset of total Euro 44 bn for 2014, of which 42 bn were allotted to financial assets, 
mainly shares of affiliated companies.6 The trading in financial assets is a mere wealth 
transformation among other active positions in the corporation’s balance-sheet. The 
dominance of financial assets changes the structure of the profit and loss account because the 
share of income from dividends, interest and coupon rates will increase to the detriment of 
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income from productive activities. In the Siemens Corporation case, the share of income from 
financial assets represented approximately 80 per cent of the annual surplus in 2014.  Detzer 
et al. (2013) provide the results of a systematic survey on the non-financial corporate sector in 
Germany. German companies increasingly invest in financial assets instead of their own fixed 
capital; however, it is not the income motive for foreign engagement but the notional capital 
gain. Thus, whether earned dividends and interest income abroad are higher than at home 
remains of minor relevance. 
 
Figure 1: Size and instruments of global derivative contracts (notional values)   
 
Sources: Author͛s ĐalĐulatioŶ aŶd preseŶtatioŶ ďased oŶ data oft he Bank for International Settlement, online, 
Table 19, World Bank online and UNCTAD online. 
 
Open and deregulated financial markets show an elevated volatility of market values and 
yields of the traded securities intensified by a high volatility of prices of important resources 
such as crude oil and other raw materials.  Financial institutions seek to cope with the problem 
of rising uncertainty by innovating derivatives and collateralized securities. The global trading 
of financial assets is no longer dominated by traditional securities such as money market 
papers, bonds or shares but by over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, completed by asset-
backed securities and futures. Stefan Schulmeister (2008) shows in detail how modern, 
electronic-based speculation in derivative markets pushed the financial markets to be detached 
from the real economy. Derivatives are based upon other securities and serve the financial 
market actors by absorbing the risk of market value and interest rate fluctuations. A traded 
bond entails a multiple turnover of respective derivatives, primarily interest contracts and 
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currently also credit default swaps. Derivatives and futures currently represent the largest part 
of the trade with securities : The notional value of all derivative contracts has increased to 
eightfold of world output since 1998, compared to twofold in 1998 (Figure 1). The notional 
value of exchange rate contracts exceeded world exports by threefold in 1998 and achieved a 
fourfold increase in 2014. The reason is simple: A high volatility of the value of derivatives 
promises short-term high returns at low equity and thus, feeds the emission of new bonds 
(Schulmeister 2009). Thus, trading with derivatives also influences the market value of the 
underlying securities through the provision of liquidity to the secondary markets, and changes 
in the market value of traded financial assets are highly correlated.7  The liquidity lunacy, 
which is misleadingly named savings glut, desires an ever-growing input of financial 
resources for one per cent of real growth. There is no one who could plausibly justify why 
less financing per this one per cent real growth would not suffice in a more stable global 
financial system. 
Figure 2: Regional distribution of gross financial flows of the EA(17), mn Euro  
 
Legend: World-others: Financial flows into central banks and non-reporting countries. 
Source: Author’s compilation and presentation based on the data set of Hobza and Zeugner (2015): 
http://www.zeugner.eu/studies/finflows/ 
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Financial flows in the EA have ridden the global wave in the run-up to the financial crisis 
2008. However, the introduction of the Euro provided them a specific push, the so-called euro 
bias: Kalemi-Ozcan et al. (2010) and Hobza und Zeugner (2015) show that gross financial 
flows among EA countries became stronger than global flows and flows with the remainder of 
the European Union. Lane (2013) finds financial linkages of the economically stronger EA 
core to have grown more with the weaker periphery, and Choi and Park (2014) find evidence 
that debt papers dominated over equity papers and bank loans. Chen et al. (2013) argue that 
financial investors have also, and increasingly, viewed euro securities as close substitutes. 
Additionally, Hobza und Zeugner (2015) emphasize that bilateral financial flows do not 
necessarily follow bilateral trade flows. The existence of offshore-centers that serve the needs 
of financial investors emphasizes the limitations in the analysis of net balances in financial 
and trade relations between two countries. Figure 2 illustrates the regional distribution of 
annual gross financial flows of the EA (17) before, during and after the global financial crisis.  
 
 
3. The transmission of autonomous financial developments into the real economy   
The section starts considering the asset-price-interest mechanism in a closed economy, 
which allows an easy introduction into the context once the economy is split into two 
countries or regions with a common currency. The starting point is equation (1) above, 
which establishes the causality running from the state of confidence on the financial 
markets through the asset prices to the long-run interest rate. With respect to financial 
assets it may be the simplest way imagining them as long-run private or sovereign bonds 
with a high degree of substitutability. Their effective interest rate or yield is set at the 
secondary market and is correlated with the correspondent derivatives (interest rate 
contracts or credit default swaps), on the one hand, and with interest rates on long-run 
bank loans on the other.  
 
3.1 The asset-price-interest mechanism in the closed economy 
 The financial as well as the non-financial corporate sectors are connected by the cash flows 
expected by the non-financial sector. A positive cash flow secures the desired solvency at all 
times and simultaneously determines the demand of the non-financial sector for and the 
supply of the financial sector of interest-bearing debt titles. We may express the expected cash 
  
9 
 
flow as the present value V of cumulated monetary flows over the lifetime of an existing 
capital stock:  
i
EVKPK
)(            (2) 
where PK is the present demand price, which the corporate sector is ready to pay for one unit 
of the given capital stock K . E(π) are the expected positive incomes from the utilization of K  
with E as the expectation operator, and i is the (of course, long-term) effective interest rate on 
the capital market. Equation (2) disregards different capital goods as well as their remaining 
lifetime. In this respect, iE /)( stands for an over the entire term and different capital goods 
differentiated present value.  
We can re-arrange equation (2) as a function of the demand price for capital goods being 
dependent on the expected returns on capital in relation to the product of the given capital 
stock and the effective capital market interest rate:  
iK
EPK
)(
          (3) 
With constant expectations E and a given interest rate, massive sales out of the given capital 
stock will lead to a fall in the demand price PK - PK is falling in K . In addition, the demand 
price is falling in i because a decrease in the present interest rate raises the present value of 
the capital stock. Finally, PK is will increase when E(π) increases.   
Equation (1) allows the expression of all statements regarding the effective interest rate as 
statements regarding the market value of debt titles. Neglecting the primarily fixed nominal 
interest rate z on a debt, (3) changes into  
)()(  AK PK
EP 
            (4) 
The state of confidence µ  affects the demand for and the supply of already issued as well as 
new securities and their market value and interest rate. When µ  increases and markets are 
open, the international trading of securities and derivatives will intensify as described in 
chapter 2.   
 Taking the total differential,  
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)()()()()()(1       (5) 
we obtain three partial differentials with the properties described above. The second partial 
differential is of specific interest: it is the decisive transmission channel of how a change in 
the state of confidence μ causes a change in the demand for debt titles and a change in the 
demand price for all capital goods, including existing and new ones. It is the demand for 
investment into physical capital that increases when a higher price for capita PK l raises the 
present value of the existing capital stock. At this point of the analysis, we find the reason 
why the increasing demand for debt-financed new capital goods boosts effective demand and 
deteriorates the current account balance with a constant propensity to import. 
 
The next step adds the supply side and explains cost responses – so to speak, second-round 
effects: An increasing demand for capital goods is satisfied primarily by the production of 
new ones and not by sales out of the given capital stock. Typical for Keynesian models is that 
the supply price for new capital goods is not independent from the demand price PK, when the 
capacity for their production is limited in the short-run. When the demand price increases, the 
supply price should follow when it reflects the increasing cost of producing an additional unit 
of the capital goods (= investment I). This linkage between demand and supply prices is the 
theory of dual prices, which is applied in Keynes (1936) as well as in Minsky (1982). The 
theory is akin to Tobin’s q-value as the ratio between the market value and the replacement 
cost of a company (Tobin 1969). The connection between the demand and the supply price or 
cost-plus price CI can be written as  
)()( KIII PCXCC          (6) 
with X as a vector of various cost and profit categories. Potential investors will invest in 
productive capacity as long as the demand price for them exceeds the cost of production of 
the next additional unit because this price-cost difference assures a notional wealth income 
gain for the owners of old as well as new capital stocks. The higher present value of the 
existent capital stock is a promise of a higher income against the expenditure for them in case 
the researchers would sell them. Banks and quasi-banks such as HLIs realize that and are 
ready to lend or buy corporate bonds and to refinance both through own borrowing. The 
process of investing comes to an end when the demand price equals the cost of the last unit in 
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the production of capital goods. The higher effective demand for capital goods entails higher 
unit costs in their production.  
 
3.2 The interregional asset-price-interest mechanism 
The case of the monetary union with two-countries S and D is illustrated in Figure 3 under the 
assumption of constant income expectations E(π) of the non-financial corporate sector. The 
horizontal axis measures the capital stock K and investment I and the vertical axis the demand 
price per unit capital PK and the marginal cost per unit new capital CK. K  is the capital stock 
in any equilibrium between both. Because the demand price is the inverse function of the 
effective interest rate on financial markets, a higher price is tantamount to a lower interest rate 
according to equation (1).   There are two demand curves for capital goods SiI )(  resp.  DiI )( . 
Both have a negative slope because PK will contract with sales out of the existing capital 
stock. In other words, the willingness of companies to offer capital goods from the stock 
declines when the demand price increases. The distinct location of both curves is fixed by the 
interest rates iS and iD. Their curves’ rightward shift is the response to a decline in the interest 
rate, a higher demand price and a higher market value of traded debt titles at a given capital 
stock. We further find a cost curve II CC , which, for simplicity reasons, applies to both 
countries (equal technologies assumed) and which reflects the increasing cost of the 
production of one additional unit of capital goods.8  This assumption is justified by an 
increasingly inelastic supply of capital and labor. When costs are dominated by labor, unit 
labor costs and total unit cost CI will also increase.9 Furthermore, we find several possible 
equilibrium points T, Z, H1 and H2 between the marginal output costs and the demand price 
for capital goods. T is the equilibrium price in country S prior to the monetary union, and Z in 
country D; H1 and H2 are hypothetical equilibriums that serve for illustration. 
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 Keynes seems to have assumed falling returns on capital as the source of increasing production cost without 
being precise what he had in mind. This weakness opened the door for a broad debate about the meaning of 
the term capital in theoretical and empirical analysis with the famous capital controversies as climax.  Since 
then, Keynesians do not treat the law of falling capital returns as a physical concept, also not in my study. There 
are different concepts in the debate, which consider an inverse relationship between the amount of capital and 
its price (see McKenna and Zannoni, 1990).  
9
 Precisely, when increasing marginal costs outpace fixed cost digression. 
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Prior to the monetary union, a lower demand price in S compared to D is tantamount to a 
higher interest rate. Financial investors in both countries understand the difference as a sign of 
a higher risk and abstain from an excessive engagement in debt papers of country S despite a 
higher nominal interest rate z and a lower price for capital. In addition, the marginal cost of 
capital goods production is lower in S than in D.  
 
Figure 3: Demand and supply prices for capital goods  
 
With the monetary union in force, the abolition of risks in country S sounds like a horn signal 
of promising capital gains not only for S resident investors but also for D investors. They will 
wish to invest more in long-term debt papers and may mobilize domestic financial resources 
from profits, issuance of bonds, and borrowing from banks. An example may be a German 
global player who releases a bond to finance the takeover of the majority of shares of a 
Spanish corporation. An increase in asset prices (stock market prices) in S would follow, as 
would a decrease in the effective interest rate i and, consecutively, of the effective interest rate 
for these shares. After accession to the monetary union, the expected capital gains in S can 
more than compensate for a possible decline in the returns from the effective interest rate. 
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These prospects trigger a flow of financial resources from D to S. The contraction in the 
interest rate iS is depicted in a rightward shift of the demand curve for capital goods in country 
S towards the demand curve in country D.  
For the owners of the existing capital stock in S, the capital gain results from the difference 
between the new PK in the hypothetical equilibrium H1 and the old PK in the initial 
equilibrium T. Thus, the conditions for finance have improved for all who desire to invest in 
the capital stock in country S and who are ready to borrow from banks, issue bonds or shares. 
The willingness to finance includes the banks, HLIs or other financial investors not only in 
country S but also in country D because financial and capital markets are now completely 
integrated and risk premiums are equalized. The flow of funds from D to S (= capital export) 
not only triggers a rising demand for capital goods in country S but also finances it ex ante. 
The rightward shift of the demand curve for capital goods (= interest rate convergence) alone 
has caused the effective demand of country S to increase and to deteriorate the trade balance 
with country D.  
A mirror-inverted process with a decrease in asset prices, a rise in the interest rate and less 
investment in country D depends on how the financial sector in D refinances the flow of funds 
to S. If balance sheets are extended or reserves are reduced, asset prices will not shrink in D. 
Then, investment and income of the entire monetary union may increase but with higher 
interregional trade imbalances. Conversely, if financial investments in S are financed 
exclusively through the liquidation of domestic active positions (sale of bonds, for example), 
a contraction of investment in D may be expected; however, this would strengthen the trade 
surplus with S because lower effective demand will also curb imports from there. Figure 2 
does not exclude such a course of events in the EA surplus countries.  
Figure 3 depicts that interest rate convergence also causes unit cost convergence, i.e., a 
deterioration of price/cost competitiveness against country D to name it as a by-product of 
cross-border finance.  If the marginal cost curve II CC were dominated by labor costs, the 
rightward shift of the demand curve would entail an increase in marginal unit labor costs 
towards point Z. A horizontal cost curve would be possible when the supply of production 
factors is infinitely elastic (the dotted continuation of IKP -line from T until H2). In this case, 
the total effect of an increase in the demand price for capital goods would be reduced to an 
increase in aggregate demand. The other extreme would be a vertical cost curve until H1. The 
total effect would be reduced to an increase in the unit labor costs with no increase in 
  
14 
 
aggregate demand. Between these two extreme possibilities, we find real world combinations 
of demand and cost effects. Again, the type of refinancing in the financial sector of D decides 
whether a downward motion follows along the cost curve in D. Decreasing costs are likely if 
financial resources were simply switched from D to S, and investment demand in D would 
have shrunk.    
3.3 An example: Germany and Spain  
Figure 4 demonstrates how the effects of financial flows are channeled through the EA’s real 
economy, using the example of Germany (D) and Spain (S). The gross financial flows of 
German residents to Spain exceeded the flows in the opposite direction at any time. They 
decreased somewhat between 2007 and 2010, but revived later considerably, although Spain 
improved its intra-EU trade balance recording a surplus since 2010 after a period of large 
deficits. The reasons for  continued and even enlarged financial flows are transfers through  
 
Figure 4: The mechanism at work in the real world: Germany and Spain 
 
Note: Gross domestic product at market prices; unit labor cost: nominal wage increase over productivity 
increase. 
Sources: Hobza and Zeugner 2015 (gross financial flows); Eurostat; author’s presentation. des Autors. 
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the EA-TARGET system and from several assistance facilities, while securities (bonds and 
others) have dominated the financial flows until 2007. The linkage with the different 
development of gross fixed capital investment in both countries suggests itself. We may 
associate the arrow with another figure depicting the convergence in long-run interest rates. 
Directly below the investment chart, we find the different paths of the gross domestic product,  
and finally at the lower left side, the real appreciation of Spain against Germany, measured by 
the two lines of the unit labor costs. Again, we may associate the arrow with a figure that 
depicts demand for labor in both EA economies.10  
 
4. Other interpretations 
I attempted to apply a monetary approach to trade imbalances and changes in competitive 
positions. This idea is shared by few, and these few have an intuitive understanding in their 
empirical research instead to explain the impact of modern finance on the real economy. 
Despite many differences in theory and political orientation, most politicians, economists, and 
the press are apt to explain the imbalances in Europe by real economy events, chiefly different 
wage policies in countries. At the risk of oversimplifying their differences, the other 
interpretations could be placed, in political terms, into two camps: the post-Keynesian camp 
blames wage policies in the EA core, and the neoclassical (or, if one desires, the mainstream) 
camp blames undisciplined wage policies in the periphery as responsible for the latter’s trade 
deficits.  For both, Stockhammer (2011: 91) summarizes: “…wage policy has a critical role 
in the rebalancing of European economies.”  
 
 Many post-Keynesian authors (among others, Flassbeck 2007, Lapavitsas et al. 2010, 
Stockhammer 2011, Pérez-Caldenty and Vernengo 2012: 19ff, Bibow 2015: 15ff) argue with 
politically initiated wage moderation in Germany, which induced a real depreciation for 
Germany. Perhaps mostly consistent, Heiner Flassbeck (2007, 2015) represents this view. He 
writes (Flassbeck 2015) that ‘wage moderation in Germany (politically volitional and 
initiated) induced a real depreciation, and this according to the most simple market theory, 
might have led economic agents in other EA countries to buy more German commodities, the 
prices of which have become relatively cheaper. (…) One may observe a change in the 
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 The correct indicator for labor demand is the vacancy rate. The rate increased strongly in Spain in the run-up 
to the crisis , while it fell in Germany (see: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/spain/job-vacancies).  
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relative prices after an exogenous push (here, wage contracts) on the one side, and, on the 
other side, a change in the net commodity trade that fits in this case’ (my translation). Such 
reasoning would be correct if physical (‘net commodity trade’) and financial resource flows 
were identical, which they are not. In addition, I am not sure that one may a priori conclude 
from wage contracts below the rate of productivity on trade surpluses (and net capital export). 
A general wage reduction in the aggregate level can have various responses on the firms’ 
level. Whatever will occur there, each traded good is different with respect to the combination 
of cost and profit factors. An aggregation of different micro situations into a true 
macroeconomic statement needs to be proved (more on this issue in the next section).  
 
Likely, the majority of European economists argue with a mirror-imaged view on wage 
policies. They conclude on harsh wage reductions in deficit countries, if necessary through a 
devaluation of the nominal exchange rate after the reintroduction of an own currency. 
However, the reasoning is different; definitely, the interest rate does matter, as in Sinn (2010). 
The rate of interest is seen as the relative price of the physical resource capital measured as its 
marginal product. The physical marginal product of capital is higher in less developed 
countries with lower capital endowment compared to higher developed countries with lower 
labor endowment. Thus, less developed countries should offer a higher price (interest rate) of 
capital. However, modern financial flows are largely detached from real resource flows and 
determine the interest rate of an economy completely independent of the marginal product of 
physical capital. Nevertheless, capital flows from the northern EA countries to the peripheral 
countries actually followed the prediction, at least in the run-up to the financial crisis. 
However, theory and the real world would be consistent only if there were a close linkage, an 
identity between financial and physical resource flows. Perhaps,11 we may expect such a 
linkage in the case of foreign direct investment, and usually a capital-augmented Balassa-
Samuelson framework is applied in empirical research (e.g., Belke et al. 2013: 6), but mostly 
without statistically significant results.  
 
Amit Bhaduri applies a completely different approach in his essay from 2011. He writes 
(Bhaduri 2011: 11): 
 “Similarly, expected capital gains due to booming asset prices usually attract 
capital inflow from overseas, and the corresponding capital account surplus in 
                                                          
11
 The ͚perhaps͚ is justified ďeĐause a foreigŶ iŶǀestŵeŶt is ǀery ofteŶ the take-over of an existing capital stock 
;ďroǁŶfield iŶǀestŵeŶtͿ aŶd Ŷot the iŶstallatioŶ of Ŷeǁ ĐapaĐities ;͚greeŶfield iŶǀestŵeŶt͛Ϳ. 
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the balance of payments would have its counterpart in current account deficit 
provided compensating capital movement is included in the capital account. On 
this accounting convention, the current account balance B, defined as export plus 
net factor income minus import, adjusts to capital account inflows and outflows to 
keep the overall payments in balance. Without specifying the possible routes 
through which such adjustments might take place, for our present purpose we 
merely note that inflow on the capital account (especially portfolio investment for 
acquisition) is encouraged by capital gains, and G has a depressing effect on the current 
account B, while higher income stimulating imports has a negative effect on the current 
account balance. 
 
Bhaduri assumes that notional capital gains induce non-financial corporations to deviate their 
financial resources from real capital investment into financial capital because the latter yields 
a higher return, and thus, private investment would shrink. Notional capital gains lure foreign 
capital inflows, and the trade balance deteriorates. Certainly, this finding follows from an 
effective demand approach, and we cannot exclude such an effect – but where? A possibly 
negative effect on physical investment in the capital exporting country may be offset by a 
positive interest rate following an asset boom in the capital receiving country. Furthermore, 
Bhaduri’s model cannot explain the routes through which a capital inflow deteriorates the 
trade balance because the interest rate, money and credit do not play any role. In addition, 
Bhaduri’s examination cannot explain the high investment-driven growth in the peripheral EA 
countries despite high capital gains in the run-up to the financial crisis.  
 
5. Empirical studies 
There are few empirical studies that assume a reversed causality and that cost and price 
competitiveness has a minor impact on trade imbalances at best.12 However these studies do 
not explain the linkage between cross- border and external imbalances in the EA.  
 
Related to the (above mentioned) idea that a general reduction of wages helps to improve 
competitiveness, Naastepad and Storm (2014) note that labor cost is a fraction of overall 
production costs of a commodity. The share of wage costs in the supply price is lower because 
of the mark-up rate on costs. The authors calculate these ‘prices’ on the industry level from 
statistics and find that unit labor costs determined the output price of the South European 
countries by 16 per cent on average, whereas another 70 per cent of the supply price was 
                                                          
12
 I disregard the well-known carry trades. They are a relevant problem in the financial relations between 
developed and less-developed countries with own currency, and I focus on studies on the EA. 
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caused by the cost of intermediary imports. For Southern Europe, the authors find also an 
increase in unit labor costs by 1 percentage point to induce the output price to increase by 
0.18 percentage points. The authors argue that trade balances should be better evaluated by 
means of export and import functions. They find that debt-financed aggregate demand plays a 
greater role than price competitiveness of domestic supply.  
 
Comunale and Hessels (2014) argue that financial integration has brought the financial cycle 
closer to the business cycle. The authors investigate how far current account balances in the 
Euro zone are caused by differences in price competitiveness or by demand fluctuations 
generated by the financial cycle. They apply panel error-correction models to exports, imports 
and the trade balance and find certain statistically significant impacts of differences in price 
competitiveness for certain EA countries. However, differences in the domestic aggregate 
demand were more important. The financial cycle would explain the trade balance better than 
fluctuations of the ‘normal’ domestic business cycle.  
 
Detzer and Hein (2014) argue that financialization had a dominant impact on EA trade 
imbalances through domestic demand and not differences in unit labor costs. In Germany, 
financialization has contributed to subdued demand, and the government followed a 
mercantilist policy to achieve permanent export surpluses, whereas other countries generated 
a debt-led consumption boom.  They find that the current account surpluses of Germany were 
not predominantly caused by a moderate wage policy and labor market reforms, but mostly by 
a revitalization of world demand for specific German products (investment goods).  However, 
the authors do not work out a coercive economic link between financialization and favorable 
world demand conditions; instead they appear to understand such a link rather as different 
policy responses to financialization.  
 
Díaz Sanchez und Varoudakis (2013) consider the real exchange rate, the current account, the 
real long-run interest rate, and the growth rate of the GDP as possibly being endogenous to 
each other. They apply a panel VAR to the EA, its core and periphery.  They find that current 
account imbalances of the peripheral countries were merely caused by changes in the 
competitiveness indicators, but rather by a domestic demand boom, triggered by greater 
financial integration and intra-regional capital flows; the latter is modeled with the real (!) 
interest rate. However, current account surpluses of the core countries were also statistically, 
although not exclusively, explained by competitiveness reforms. This finding partly supports 
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the critiques of Germany’s wage policy. However, as always in empirical research, the results 
are sensitive to econometric methods and data. My co-author Karsten Staehr and I applied 
Granger causality tests and VAR modeling to a panel of 27 EU countries and various sub-
panels to identify these causalities (Gabrisch and Staehr 2014, 2015). In all test versions, we 
find that an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which is indicated either by relative unit 
labor costs or by the inflation differential, statistically follows a net inflow of capital and not 
vice versa.  
 
 
6. Closing remarks  
This study has sought to show that the virtual explosion of cross-border financial flows in the 
global as well as the EA economy is the result of the opening and deregulation of financial 
markets and the following rise and frequent changes in the state of confidence, and not of 
developments in the real economy. However, cross-border financial flows entail adjustments 
in the real economy of participating countries, among them competitive positions and external 
imbalances. The lens of the liquidity-preference theory helps to identify the interregional 
asset-price-interest mechanism as the transmission channel from financial to real economy 
developments in the monetary union. Systematic empirical research on the EA has supported 
the view that it is not the wage policy but the uncontrolled life of financial markets and 
institutions in the EA that is responsible for external imbalances and the split of the monetary 
union into debtor and creditor countries.  Therefore, we may state that the political debate in 
Europe is heavily distorted. The debate circles around the issue of how to reform rigid labor 
markets to reduce unit labor costs. The control and reduction of destabilizing finance is not at 
the heart of the debate. The knowledge exists regarding how one can do this; it is a political 
implementation problem, and its discussion goes beyond the scope of this essay.  
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